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 TAKING ‘HEALTH’ AS A SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHT SERIOUSLY: IS 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE A REMEDY 
FOR THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM? 
Sabrina Germain* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Nineteen ninety-six marked the beginning of a new era for South Africa. After 
a long struggle to free itself from the apartheid regime, it had successfully drafted 
“the most admirable constitution in the history of the world” 1 . Nonetheless 
everything still had to be done to reconcile the social and economic fracture that was 
tearing apart the country. This document had to provide continual reinvention to 
make sense of a changing world and the new South Africa.2 The answers provided by 
the Constitution had to be more than ‘admirable’, they had to be ‘transformative’. 
Indeed, unlike most liberal constitutions, the primary concern was not to restrain 
State power, but to accelerate fundamental changes in a legacy of injustice resulting 
from over three centuries of colonial and apartheid rule.3  
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 1 C.R. Sunstein, Designing Democracy: What Constitutional Do, Oxford University Press (2001). 
 2 Karl E. Klare, Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism, 14 SAJHR 146-155, 155 (1998). 
 3 S. Liebenberg, Protecting Economic, Social & Cultural Rights under Bill of Rights: the South African Experience, 
16 (3) HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDER (2007) 2-6, at 2. 
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 It soon became obvious to the drafters that without access to basic levels of 
social and economic services, no effective civil or political changes could take place in 
the deeply divided country. Hence, the final document incorporates a detailed list of 
socio-economic rights tailored to the peculiar needs and context of South Africa.4  
 
Nonetheless, concerns were then raised with regard to a blurry separation of 
powers that would stem from the interpretation of these rights.5  The nuance these 
rights require for their enforcement portrays the flexibility that is expected on the 
part of the judiciary, the executive, and the legislative branch when it comes to 
fulfilling their respective responsibilities. This approach results in the overlapping of 
spheres of authority. 6  A fluid, dialogic model of separation of powers is to be 
preferred for the promotion of a transformative jurisprudence on socio-economic 
rights. Certainly, the questions of allocation socio-economic right litigation trigger call 
for a more cooperative and flexible relationship between the branches.7  
 
 Today, South Africa continues fighting its demons with the help and trust it 
has put in its institutions and the pre-eminent role it has given to its Constitutional 
Court. Even if sometimes subject to criticism, the contextualising method practiced 
by the Court remains a progressive way of enforcing individual and collective rights.  
                                                     
 4 Ibid, at 2. 
 5 S. Seedorf & S. Sibanda, Seperation of Powers, in S Woolman and M Bishop (eds), Constitutional Law 
of South Africa Vol.2, JUTA (2002), 12. 
 6 Ibid. 
 7 S. Ngcobo, South Africa’s Transformative Constitution Towards an Appropriate Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 
2 STELLENBOCH LAW REVIEW (2011) 37-49, at 41. 
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Interestingly enough this model, although saluted by many democracies, does 
not trigger a renewal in constitutional methodologies. In fact, the United States 
Supreme Court has not only been reluctant to recognise or incorporate socio-
economic rights in its Constitution and legislation, it also remains firm in its 
appreciation of a ‘pure’ form of separation of powers showing no real sensitivity to 
the American social or historical context when ruling on resource allocation.8 
 
 The United States Constitution as the oldest written nation-governing charter 
in the world9 is determined to stand firm on its ground. The strict balance of power 
that characterises the American system makes it averse to the concept of socio-
economic rights, and unwelcoming to any flexibility. Unfortunately, this static 
conception of the separation of powers presents certain limitations and fails to 
account for the shifting nature of society.10 
 
 Taking a closer look at urgent issues affecting America one cannot help but 
wonder why the Supreme Court has not yet learned some of the lessons from its 
South African counterpart when it comes to allocation of its health care resources. 
The debate surrounding the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s (ACA)11 
                                                     
 8  M.S. Kende, The South African Constitutional Court’s Embrace of Socio-Economic Rights: A Comparative 
Perspective, 6 CHAP. L. REV. (2003) 137-160. 
 9 Ibid at 160. 
 10 S. Liebenberg, Socio-economic Rights Adjudication Under a Transformative Constitution, JUTA (2010). 
 11 H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. (2009-2010), Public Law 111–148. 
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certainly brought up issues of constitutionality,12 and more particularly the central 
question of Congress’ capacity to impose the purchase of health insurance on all 
Americans. It is as if the insurance industry crisis and the un-insurability of millions 
of Americans were slightly overlooked and clouded by constitutional questions. 
Unfortunately, allocation issues were left in the background, the Court preferring to 
adopt a deeply federalist approach in its resolution of the case.  
 
The path of dependency on which America has been evolving for the past 
century now translates into actual scarcity issues and an ill-suited insurance system. 
These important shortcomings are surely a result of a profound miscomprehension 
on the part of the government, the legislature but also the judiciary.  
 
 Using a comparative functionalist approach, this article aims at presenting the 
differences in the role played by the Supreme and Constitutional Court when it 
comes to the adjudication of the right to health, and more broadly socio-economic 
rights. The constitutional implications entailed in the allocation of health care 
resources will also be developed in both contexts. First, the originality of the South 
African model of socio-economic right adjudication will be analysed, focusing on 
four land-mark cases that illustrate the ‘distinctive’ nature of the South African 
Constitution and the Court’s evolving standard of review. Second, the relationship 
between the different branches of government and the dialogue they maintain in 
                                                     
 12 Congress’ capacity to impose the purchase of insurance health insurance on all Americans has been 
questioned. The answer lies within the Commerce Clause that grants Congress with the power “to regulate 
commerce…among the several states” U.S. CONST., art. I, §8, cl. 3. 
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order to enforce socio-economic rights will be fleshed out, giving particular attention 
to the Court’s contextualising efforts. Contrastingly, the American model of ‘strict’ 
separation of powers and its implications for the distribution of health resources will 
be presented. Finally, arguments will be made in favour of a more contextualised 
resolution of allocation cases by the American Supreme Court, and a more robust 
approach in the implementation of remedial measures by the South African 
Constitutional Court. 
 
 
I. ADJUDICATION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND THE 
IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXTUALISATION 
 
A. The ‘Holistic’ List of Socio-Economic Rights 
 The shift from the parliamentary sovereignty regime of the apartheid era to 
the system of constitutional democracy with an entrenched and justiciable Bill of 
Rights is by far the most outstanding structural and normative change South Africa 
has undergone.13 The Bill of Rights created legal foundations for the establishment of 
a true democracy for South Africa helping to build the new “rainbow nation”.14 
 
                                                     
 13 S. Liebenberg, supra note 11. 
 14 Term coined by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the phrase was elaborated upon by President Nelson 
Mandela: “Each of us is as intimately attached to the soil of this beautiful country as are the famous jacaranda 
trees of Pretoria and the mimosa trees of the bushveld- a rainbow nation at peace with itself and the world”. 
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 This resulted in sections 26(1) and 27(1) of the Constitution granting everyone 
with the right to access: “adequate housing; health care services, including 
reproductive health care; sufficient food and water; and social security, including, if 
they are unable to support themselves and their dependants, appropriate social 
assistance.”15 Duties were also imposed on the State to “take reasonable legislative 
and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve progressive realisation 
of each of these rights”.16 
 
 During the drafting stages extensive debates with regard to the inclusion of 
socio-economic rights animated the authors. Opponents to their inclusion argued 
that the judicial enforcement of these rights would result in a breach of the separation 
of powers leading to judicial usurpation of governmental powers over budgetary 
matters and social policy. The lack of institutional legitimacy, or required training and 
skills of the judiciary to make such decisions was also heavily highlighted.17 Some 
even argued that the inclusion of these rights would raise unrealistic expectations with 
regard to their enforcement.18  
 
Nonetheless, it was obvious that without access to basic levels of social and 
economic services and resources, no effective civil or political changes could take 
                                                     
 15 S.A. CONST. ch. II, § 26, cl.1, and §27, cl.1. 
 16 S.A. CONST. ch. II, §27, cl.2. 
 17 S. Liebenberg, supra note 3. 
18 M. Pieterse, A Benefit Focused Analysis of Constitutional Health Rights (2005). 
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place in the deeply divided country. 19  Therefore, the final document had to 
incorporate the idea of separation of powers in a manner that could meet the peculiar 
needs of the South African context. It was also contended, that elevating these 
second generation rights to the rank of immutable constitutional values would leave 
intact the legitimacy of the Bill of Rights, and help to safeguard the institutional 
legitimacy of the judiciary, without stirring significant separation of powers and 
counter-majoritarian tensions. 20  Obviously socio-economic rights matters would 
involve choice-sensitive and polycentric issues, but the Court would have the tools to 
face the challenges of rationing and prioritising resources. 21 
 
The South African Constitution became internationally renowned for the 
inclusion of its holistic set of socio-economic rights.22 These rights are certainly the 
most innovative part of the Constitution. They are the foundation for a new society 
based on social justice and a more just distribution of resources.23 They also provide 
mechanisms for disadvantaged groups to hold the State accountable, avoiding having 
their fundamental needs disregarded, and assist the State in defending redistributive 
social legislation and programmes. 24  Socio-economic rights remain a valuable 
democratic safeguard. In a similar manner as the election cycle, they provide a 
                                                     
 19 Ibid. 
20 M. Pieterse, supra note 20. 
21 Ibid. 
 22 S. A. CONST. ch. II, art. 22-23, and 25-27. 
 23 S. Liebenberg, supra note 3. 
 24 S. Liebenberg, supra note 11. 
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compliance mechanism indirectly holding the executive accountable to its positive 
duties. 
 
B. The Positive/Negative Right Suma Divisio Revisited 
 The South African Constitution ultimately aims at facilitating and promoting 
the enjoyment of rights. Socio-economic rights are not merely pre-existing 
entitlements they are activated under the justiciable Bill of Rights. In fact, the State is 
required to act positively to ensure their realisation. Prescriptions are made to the 
government to undertake affirmative action programmes,25 and provisions on the 
way property redistribution has to be carried out are also included.26 
 
 Socio-economic rights form a strong web of duties and rights imposed both 
on the State and the individual. It is their interrelated, interdependent and mutually 
supportive character that finds strength in the structure and the text of the 
Constitution. Section 7 confirms that all rights enclosed in the Bill of Rights impose 
both positive and negative obligations on the State. 27  The traditional suma diviso 
separating human and constitutional rights into ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ categories is 
dissolved. These rights require the protection but also the input from all branches of 
government giving them their dual nature.  
                                                     
 25 S.A. CONST. ch. II, §9, cl.2. 
 26 S.A. CONST. ch. II, §25, cl.2. 
 27 P. De Vos, Grootboom, the Right of Access to Housing and Substantive Equality as Contextual Fairness, 17 S. 
AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. (2001), 258-276, at 260-261. 
9 
Central objections have been raised with respect to the characterisation of 
social and civil rights as respectively positive and negative rights. In this view, positive 
rights are seen as requiring extensive State action and resources to be realised. 
Therefore, the legal enforcement of positive rights would require courts without 
institutional competence to make judgment calls on budgetary allocation and social 
policy, partly breaching the traditional conception of democratic separation of 
powers.28 Nonetheless, socio-economic rights are still adjudicated as bearing both 
negative and positive duties. This atypical interpretation of Bill of Rights is necessary 
to insure the realisation of the Constitution’s transformative goals. A flexible 
implementation on the part of the Court is necessary and the collaboration of the 
executive in this area is essential. 
 
 Judgements relating to the adjudication of socio-economic rights have 
reaffirmed the importance of this ‘revisited’ suma divisio. The Court indicated that 
socio-economic rights were “at least to some extent, justiciable”, and “[a]t the very 
minimum… negatively protected from improper invasion” 29 . In cases such as 
Grootboom v Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others 30 (Grootboom) the Court 
confirms that the right of access to housing creates both negative31 and positive32 
                                                     
 28 L. Forman, What future for the minimum core? Contextualising the implications of South African 
Socieconomic Rights Jurisprudence for the International Human Right to Health, in J. Harrington and M. 
Stuttaford (eds), Global Health and Human Rights Legal and Philosophical Perspectives, Routledge Research in Human 
Rights Law (2010) 62-80. 
 29 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa ¶78 (1996). (‘Certification of the Constitution’) 
 30 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom & Others, SA 46 (2001). (‘Grootboom’) 
 31 Ibid. at ¶34; See also, Jafta v Schoeman (2005) 2 SA 140 (CC), in this case the cost of implications of 
resource free negative obligations are well presented. The Constitutional Court held that civil procedural 
10 
obligations for the State. While the decision is certainly an endorsement of the 
justiciability of social rights, the qualification made by the Court in this regard also 
reflects a new approach to their enforcement.33 
 
C. The ‘Reasonableness’ Standard of Review: a Benchmark for 
Distribution  
 The South African Constitutional Court has developed a unique method of 
review for claims that seek the enforcement of positive duties imposed by socio-
economic rights. While rejecting the interpretation of sections 26 and 27 as granting 
individuals with a claim to direct provision of essential basic level of goods and 
services from the State, the Court also rejects the so-called ‘minimum core obligation’ 
coined by the General Comments of the United Nations Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (CESCR). 34  The Court has argued that it lacks the necessary 
information to specify the content of the minimum core obligations due to the 
diversity of needs of the different groups present in South Africa35. It goes further in 
                                                                                                                                                              
measures in the Magistrate’s Courts Act that allowed the sale in the execution of people’s homes without 
judicial oversight constituted a negative breach of the section 26(1) right to adequate housing that could only be 
justified by a robust limitation analysis in terms of the s36 general limitation clause. 
 32 Ibid. at ¶38. 
 33 L. Forman, supra note 32. 
 34 The concept of minimum core obligations’ was initially adopted by the Committee in its General 
Comment 3, The Nature of States Parties obligations [art 2(1) of the Covenant], UN Doc E/1991/23(1990)[10]. 
35 Grootboom at ¶33. 
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its criticism by saying that the notion is inconsistent with the institutional roles and 
competencies of the judiciary.36 
 
 The landmark decision of Grootboom adopts a new standard of review. The 
concept of ‘reasonable measures’ requires the consideration of the “degree and extent 
of the denial of the right the [claimant] endeavours to realise.”37 The Court adds that 
“[t]hose whose needs are most urgent and whose ability to enjoy all rights is therefore 
most in peril, must not be ignored by the measures aimed at achieving realisation of 
the right.”38  
 
The assessment of the reasonableness of governmental programmes was 
influenced by two factors. First, the internal limitations of sections 26(2) and 27(2)39 
that require the rights to be “progressively realised”40, and second the availability of 
resources as “an important factor in determining what is reasonable”41. In a nutshell, 
the reasonableness standard of review insists that the benchmark should be set 
according to whether or not measures taken by the State to implement programmes 
for the progressive realisation of the relevant rights were reasonable.42 
  
                                                     
 36 Minister of Health & Others v Treatment Action Campaign & Others, ¶ 37-38, 5 SA (2002). 
(‘T.A.C.’). 
 37 Grootboom at ¶44. 
 38 Ibid. 
 39 S.A. CONST. ch. II, § 26, cl.1, and §27, cl.1. 
 40 Grootboom at ¶99. 
 41 Ibid. at ¶46. 
 42 S. Liebenberg, supra note 3, at 3. 
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In his commentary on the South African Constitutional Laws43 David Bilchitz 
gives some precisions with regard to the reasonableness standard introduced by 
Grootboom. He quotes his fellow colleague Cora Hoexter to explain that the 
reasonableness standard should be understood as partially reminiscent of its use in 
administrative law. Simply put,  
“A reasonable decision is one that is supported by reason and 
evidence, rationally connected to purpose, and is objectively 
capable of furthering that purpose. A reasonable decision 
generally also tends to reflect proportionality between ends 
and means, and between benefits and detriments.”44 
 
Critiques of this alternative approach suggest that the Court missed an 
opportunity to act as a more effective agent of social change. Simply identifying the 
content of each right could have provided a more concrete meaning to socio-
economic rights.45 Had the Court taken the lead on this issue, the executive would 
have benefited from a clearer understanding of the constitutional requirements 
necessary to realise a progressive program. Individuals, on the other hand, would 
have found it easier to hold the executive accountable for its failure to deliver their 
most pressing needs.46 
 
                                                     
43 D. Bilchitz, Health, in in S Woolman and M Bishop (eds), Constitutional Law of South Africa Vol.2, 
JUTA (2002), 56A. 
44 C. Hoexter, The Future of Judicial Review in South African Administrative Law, 117 SALJ (2000). 
 45 D. Bilchitz, Towards a Reasonable Approach to the Minimum Core: Laying the Foundation for Future Socio-
economic Rights Jurisprudence, 19 SAJHR (2003) 1-26, at 8; See also, for an example of concrete interpretation of 
socio economic right, Social and Economic Rights Action Center & the Center for Economic and Social Rights 
v Nigeria, African Commission on Human and People’s Rights Communication No. 155/96 (2001). 
 46 K. Lehmann, In Defense of the Constitutional Court: Litigating Socio-Economic Rights and the Myth of the 
Minimum Core, 22 AM. U. INT’L. REV. (2006-2007) 163- 197, at 165. 
13 
By adopting the reasonableness standard of review rather than a stout right-
based approach the Court diminished its institutional voice and the one of vulnerable 
groups. Indeed, this standard requires the understanding of complex and budgetary 
issues “making it all but impossible for poor people to bring [socio-economic] rights 
cases without extensive technical and financial support” 47. 
 
 In point of fact, the primary concern raised with respect to the reasonableness 
standard is its indeterminacy. No specific temporal priorities to guide the timely 
realisation of policy or programmes are clearly stated, nor are the urgency, 
desperation, and the key population of the poor and vulnerable affected by the 
enforcement of this standard clearly defined. 48  Some commentators remain 
convinced that this standard will endanger the balance of power present between 
South African institutions.49 
 
At the very minimum, the context-bound nature of this standard calls for 
some specification to better appraise the government’s actions in a variety of 
situations. In other words, when determining the ‘reasonableness’ of a governmental 
conduct a presupposed ‘acontextal’ standard should be used to lead the evaluation.50 
  
                                                     
47  J. Dugard, Courts and the Poor in South Africa: a Critique of Systemic Judicial Failures to Advance 
Transformative Justice, 24 SAJHR (2008) 214-238, at 236. 
 48 L. Forman, supra note 32. 
 49 K. Lehmann, supra note 50, at 178. 
50 D. Bilchitz, supra note 49, at 10. 
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D. Landmark Cases: Understanding the Diversity in Judgment 
 The socio-economic rights jurisprudence develops on a case-by-case basis. A 
cumulative reading of the constitutional judgments shows that some guiding 
principles help the Court in its goal of distilling a ‘distinctively South African model 
of separation of powers’.51 At a conceptual level the Court makes no real difference 
between its approach to traditional civil and political rights from the adjudication of 
any other rights, nonetheless it is of prime importance to closer examine allocation of 
resources cases. This specific set of cases helps to better understand how the notion 
of separation of power has become crucial in the just distribution of state resources.52 
 
1. Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal) 
 Mr. Soobramoney brought a challenge before the Court to compel the 
KwaZulu-Natal health department to provide him with an onerous treatment.53 At 
the time of the application, Mr. Soobramoney was forty-one years old, unemployed 
and suffered from critical chronic renal failure. Regular renal dialysis could have 
prolonged his life, but it was unclear for how long.54 The indigent applicant could not 
afford the dialysis from the private sector, and therefore was seeking it from a state 
hospital. 55  The hospital refused his application for failure to meet the eligibility 
criteria of the dialysis program due to his multiple medical conditions. 56  It is 
                                                     
 51 S. Seedorf and S. Sibanda, supra note 6. 
 52 Ibid. 
 53 Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal), ¶3, 1 SA (1998). (‘Soobramoney’) 
 54 Ibid. at ¶1. 
 55 Ibid. at ¶5. 
 56 Ibid. at ¶3. 
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important to note that at the time of the case many South Africans in that province 
could not even have access to any form of health care services.57 
 
 In Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal) (Soobramoney) the Court 
sided with the State. It rejected the argument that the hospital violated Mr. 
Soobromoney’s right to health care by putting in place a rational policy to ensure that 
a scarce resource was made available to a specific segment of the population.58 The 
decision seemed to indicate that the constitutional right to health held little force 
against policy-making or resource allocation considerations.59 The Court explained 
that at the functional level priorities had to be set: 
“What is apparent from these provisions is that the obligations 
imposed on the state by section 26 and 27 in regard to access 
to housing, health care, food, water and social security are 
dependent upon the resources available for such purposes, and 
that the corresponding rights themselves are limited by reasons 
of the lack of resources. Given this lack of resources and the 
significant demands on them that have already been referred to 
an unqualified obligation to meet these needs would not 
presently be capable of being fulfilled. This is the context 
within which section 27(3) must be construed.”60 
 
 The Court aimed to demonstrate that decisions should be taken at the political 
level to tailor the health budget around the population’s needs.61 The Court did not 
want to interfere with this rational decision-making process since it believed the 
                                                     
 57 P. De Vos, supra note 31, at 260. 
 58 Soobramoney at ¶25. 
 59 D. Moellendorf, Reasoning about Resources: Soobramoney and the Future of Socio-Economic Rights Claims, 14 
S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. (1998) 327; and C. Ngwenya, The Recognition of Access to Health Care as a Human Right 
in South Africa: Is it Enough?, 5 HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2000) 33.  
 60 Soobramoney at ¶11. 
 61 K. Lehmann, supra note 50, at 165. 
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allocation was made by State institutions in good faith and to the best of their 
capabilities. 62  By siding with the claimant the Court felt it would not have been 
implementing socio-economic rights, but rather infringing the executive’s power. 
 
 The Court made a point of reiterating its role and the respect it had for the 
division of powers. It felt it should not be allocating resources, but rather had to 
confine its task to the determination of whether or not the distribution of such 
resources was made in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. 
 
However, the Court should have kept in mind that the inclusion of a 
justiciable right to health in the Bill of Right would call for the creation of a 
substantive benchmark for allocation. Inevitably, the content of this right has to 
impact the prioritisation processes involved in rationing. 63  This case exemplifies the 
Court’s challenge and reluctance in interpreting the right to life and emergency 
medical treatment as a requiring the prioritisation of life-saving treatment over other 
medical needs. It may very well be that the Court’s restrictive interpretative approach 
betrays its discomfort with regard to the ranking of applicants needs triggered by the 
adjudication of socio-economic rights. Unfortunately, this ‘priority-free’ interpretation 
may have stifled the dialogue over the development of principles guiding health 
rationing processes. 64 
                                                     
 62 Soobramoney at ¶29. 
63 See also P. Carsten and D. Pearmain, Foundation Principles of South African Medical Law, Butterworths 
LexisNexis (2007). 
64 M. Pieterse, Health Care Rights, Resources and Rationing, 127 SALJ (2007) 514- 536, at 527. 
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The Soobramoney case is putting the finger on a sensitive issue present in a majority 
of developed countries at the dawn of the twenty first century. Courts now have to 
decide whether the value of an individual life should prevail over the quality of life of 
a larger group. This problem has been approached pragmatically in South Africa, 
nonetheless it still raises some fundamental ethical questions. The case has set the 
table for all issues of separation of powers and resources allocation the South African 
Constitutional Court would have to address in the following socio-economic rights 
cases. 
 
2. Grootboom and Others v Government of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others 
 In 2001, only a few years after the Soobramoney case, the Constitutional Court 
heard one of its most important and revolutionary socio-economic right cases. The 
Grootboom case finally created a benchmark in the development of a more general test 
for the adjudication of constitutional rights.65 With this decision the Court reaffirmed 
its commitment to the enforcement and the justiciability of social and economic 
rights guaranteed by the Constitution.66 
 
 Mrs. Grootboom sought relief from the Court after having been evicted from 
the land she was occupying. 67  The applicant and her family started squatting on 
                                                     
 65 Grootboom at ¶60-64. 
 66 Pierre De Vos, supra note 31, at 261. 
 67 Grootboom at ¶3. 
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private land after the shack in which, her and fellow applicants, were living in became 
inhabitable because of its “intolerable”68 conditions.69 
 
 This case very well illustrates the revisited suma diviso animating socio-
economic rights. Although section 26(1) does not expressly place a negative 
obligation upon the State and all other entities and persons to desist from preventing 
or impairing the right of access to adequate housing, such a duty was implied.70 Even 
with both positive and negative obligations found in the right to housing the Court 
held back on dictating policy. In fact, the Court even gave the government discretion 
as to how to comply with the law.71 
 
 The Court held that the State had no obligation to provide shelter to Mrs. 
Grootboom as an individual. It also found that the housing programme was 
unconstitutional as it was ‘unreasonable’.72 The new standard of review was then 
expounded. Unreasonableness resulted from the lack of coordination and 
understanding on the part of all spheres of government that failed to create a policy 
answering the pressing housing needs in South Africa. Indeed, the programme in 
place only catered for medium and long-term housing solutions.73 No provision was 
                                                     
 68 Ibid. at ¶3. 
 69 Ibid. at ¶7. 
 70 L. Henkin, S. Cleveland, L.R. Helfer , G.L. Neuman, and D.F. Orentlicher,  Human Rights, 2nd ed. 
(2009). 
 71 M. S. Kende, supra note 9, at 145. 
 72 Grootboom at ¶69. 
 73 Ibid. at ¶66. 
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made for a short-term housing solution for those “whose needs [were] the most 
urgent and whose ability to enjoy all rights therefore [were] most in peril.”74 
 
 Grootboom demonstrates that placing socio-economic rights in a constitution 
does not equate to providing individuals with assistance on demand. It is the idea that 
an entire ‘sensitive’ group could be left out of a social policy that shocked the Court. 
Indeed, “[a] program that excludes a significant segment of society cannot be said to 
be reasonable.” 75  The reasonableness standard was further refined, reinterpreting 
section 26 stating that “[t]he state must take reasonable legislative and other 
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this 
right.”76 The Court also added that the program must not only be ‘reasonable’, it 
needed to be “reasonably implemented, [since] an otherwise reasonable programme 
that [was] not implemented reasonably [would] not constitute compliance with the 
State’s [positive] obligations.”77 
 
The Court proceeded with an order spelling out the obligations of all three 
spheres of government. Unfortunately, the order lacked specificity as to how the 
obligations had to be carried out. The lack of clarity of this measure was later 
exploited by local and federal governments to shy away from its implementation.78 
                                                     
 74 Ibid. at ¶44. 
 75 Ibid. at ¶42. 
 76 S. A. CONST., ch. II, §26, cl.1. 
 77 Grootboom ¶42. 
78 “Apart from endorsing an undertaking by the South African Human Rights Commission to monitor 
the implementation of its order (which implied that the provincial government had to amend its housing plan 
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While Grootboom was setting new standards for socio-economic rights cases, it also 
created some uproar because of its rejection of the minimum core standard. The 
transition to a ‘reasonableness’ standard was perceived as a failure due to the short-
changing of social rights provisions of the Constitution.79 The Court had decided to 
take into consideration the country’s overwhelming poverty and its constitutional 
commitment to equality, dignity and freedom to justify the decision rather than to 
specify the content of the minimum core.80 
 
3. Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others 
 In the Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and 
Others (T.A.C.) case, a group of organisations brought a challenge against the 
government with regard to the provision of Nevirapine, a drug given to HIV positive 
pregnant women to protect their foetuses from HIV infection.81 The drug had not 
been made available to all of women at state clinics and hospitals because of the 
government’s concerns with the drug’s safety. 82  Only designated test sites were 
authorised to distribute the drug, to a selective group of women, ensuring that the 
efficacy of the drug, potential side effects, and dangers attendant on its use were 
                                                                                                                                                              
so as to conform with the dictates of reasonableness), the Court did not supplement its declaratory order with 
any structural mechanism through which compliance with it could be assured. Perhaps predictably, there was 
limited compliance with the order. More significantly, the order did not result in the alleviation of the housing 
needs of the successful litigants.” M. Pieterse, Eating Socioeconomic rights: Usefulness of Rights Talk in Alleviating 
Social Hardship Revisited, 29 HUMAN RIGHTS QUATERLY (2007) 796-822, at 808; See e.g. K. Pillay, 
Implementation of Grootboom: Implications for the Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights, 6 LAW, DEMOCRACY & 
DEV. (2002) 255-277. 
 79 L. Forman, supra note 32. 
 80 Grootboom at ¶40-44. 
 81 T.A.C. at  ¶2. 
 82 T.A.C. at ¶16. 
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carefully monitored.83 Also, a formal ban on the drug was in effect for all other clinics 
in the country. At that stage, the government did not provide any precise timeline to 
health care providers for the expected completion of the testing programme.84 
 
 The government made its case out of the reasonableness of the program and 
its preoccupation with cost containment and the safety of the people involved in the 
drug trial. It also pointed out its disbelief in the judicial review of health policy, 
questioning the democratic legitimacy of the process. 
 
This case then became a test of the Court’s willingness to meaningfully 
enforce the State’s duties under section 27. The Court went ahead and firmly rejected 
the government’s arguments that the judicial review of health policy constituted a 
breach of the separation of powers, or that its judgements could be characterised as 
declaratory orders. 85  Also, it successfully reaffirmed its constitutional authority to 
order injunctive relief and supervisory orders.86 It is certainly the consequences for 
millions of HIV-infected South Africans that could see their livelihood greatly 
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impacted by the availability of Nevirapine that weighted in the decision87, although 
the Court deeply underpinned its judgment with the experts testimonies presented by 
both parties.88 
 
It is also important to highlight that the cost of implementation of the 
remedial measures ordered by the Court was minimal. It was well within the 
government’s budget to provide Nevirapine to the overall population. The Court 
found that the additional costs associated with providing testing, counselling, and 
breastfeeding were negligible. This case shows again the Court’s tendency to privilege 
contextual circumstances over issues of constitutionality when adjudicating resource 
allocation cases. 
 
 Although deciding on a political issue rather than on the constitutionality of 
the case, the Court showed respect for the separation of powers asserting that it 
would be for the “government…to devise and implement a more comprehensive 
policy that will give access to health care services to HIV-positive mothers and their 
new-born children, and will include the administration of Nevirapine where that [was] 
appropriate.”89  
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Heinz Klug pointed out, that T.A.C goes beyond Grootboom by providing the 
government with a rather specific directive.90 The fact that both cases do not equate 
to a typical rationing dilemma unlike the one presented in Soobramoney, results in the 
Court refusing to go forth with structural interdicts. Nonetheless, it still proceeded 
with declaratory and mandatory orders without retaining jurisdiction.91 The Court 
believed the directive was robust enough since “the government [had] always 
respected and executed orders (…) [,and that there was] no reason to believe that it 
[would] not do so in the present case”.92 The Court’s discussion of the relief it is 
capable of imposing is commendable, nonetheless it seems that no lessons were 
learned from the mistakes made in Grootboom. 
 
 In sum, T.A.C. enabled the Court to reaffirm its reasonableness standard of 
review and emphasise the sometime limited role of the judiciary in intergovernmental 
relations.93 
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E. Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others 
In 2008, the Constitutional Court rules on the Mazibuko and Others v City of 
Johannesburg and Others 94  (Mazibuko) case. Applicants petitioned the Court to 
consider whether the installation and operation of prepaid water meters, 
automatically disconnecting when reaching the quota set by Free Basic Water policy 
(FBW), and making it impossible to get any additional water without credit, were 
legal. In this case it was never disputed that all applicants were greatly and equally 
disadvantaged. The Court had then to consider whether the FBW policy was 
reasonable with reference to section 27(1) and (2) of the Constitution guaranteeing 
the right of access to sufficient water.95 
 
It appears that the Court produced a judgment that is the exception 
confirming the rule. Indeed, it rejected any context-based arguments, and found that 
the City of Johannesburg’s FBW policy fell well “within the bound of 
reasonableness”.96 Also, the applicants’ poverty, and the fact that no adequate access 
to water was provided causing them great hardship were bluntly disregarded; in fact 
these undisputed facts received no real attention in the judgment.  
 
Instead, the Court chose to focus on bureaucratic data relating to the city’s 
difficulty to supply water in Soweto. Many scholars were disappointed with this 
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judgment as the evaluation of the policy was conducted in the abstract, and the 
justifications provided by the city were instantly taken at face value without any 
contextualising efforts.97 
 
F. The Importance of Learning from the Past and Contextualising 
  Apartheid had long symbolised the disenfranchisement of the black 
population, and had institutionalised a system that maintained white domination and 
privileges in the political, economic, social and cultural spheres.98 A great majority of 
South Africans were deprived of political freedom, and the means to secure 
economic prosperity. Understood in the light of this context, the Constitution had to 
fuel the political transformation necessary to create a democratic society based on 
respect for differences, and to facilitate social and economic change.99 It was also the 
ultimate post-apartheid ‘institution’ that helped to increase the new government’s 
legitimacy and accountability. Today, the provisions of the Bill of Rights must still be 
interpreted with reference to this historical context, and in the light of present social 
and economic conditions.100 Fundamental to an understanding of these conditions is 
the acceptance that great discrepancies in wealth and social status are still very much 
present in the country.101 
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 The Constitutional Court has time and again emphasised the importance of 
taking into account the historical, social and economic context in the interpretation it 
makes of the provisions of the Bill of Rights.102 The understanding of the scope and 
content of the various socio-economic rights depends on an understanding of the 
history that led to the constitutional provisions. 103  Justice Yacoob reiterated in 
Grootboom, that the contextual interpretation of rights requires the consideration of 
two types of contexts. First the textual context, that leans on Chapter II and the 
overall Constitution. Second, the scope and meaning of the Bill of Rights, that is to 
be interpreted bearing in mind the country’s historical background.104 
 
Determination of the constitutionality of state action or inaction relating to 
the realisation of social and economic rights is therefore conducted with reference to 
the impact these policies, or lack thereof, could have on the group under scrutiny. In 
three out of the four landmark cases, the Court conducted its review keeping in mind 
structural and social inequalities, and paying closer attention to existing discrepancies 
between specific groups.105 As constitutional law Professor Pierre de Vos points out:  
“What is required is to take into account the impact of the 
state’s action or omission on a specific group with reference to 
the social and economic context within which the group finds 
itself. State plans aimed at the progressive realisation of any of 
the social and economic rights guaranteed in the Constitution 
that fail to take cognisance of the different ways in which the 
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 105 C. Albertyn and B. Goldblatt, Facing the Challenge of Transformation: Difficulties in the Development of an 
Indigenous Jurisprudence of Equality and a Compassionate Justice 13 SAJHR (1997) 225-60 ; Hon. Claire L’Heureux-
Dubé Making a Difference: The Pursuit of Equality and a Compassionate Justice 13 SAJHR (1997) 338-41. 
27 
plan will impact on groups within different social and 
economic contexts will be constitutionally suspect. Some 
groups would have suffered from ‘patterns of disadvantage 
and harm’ in the past due to their race, sex, gender, class or 
geographical location and will be economically particularly 
vulnerable. The more economically disadvantaged and 
vulnerable a group is found to be, the greater the possibility 
that a court may find that there was a constitutional duty on 
the state to pay special attention to the needs of such a 
group.”106 
 
 The transformative nature of the Bill of Right needs to be accepted in order to 
understand how socio-economic right judgements such as Soobramoney and Grootboom 
are in fact consistent. Although the outcomes could be perceived as contradictory 
both cases provide tools for the implementation of rights in their respective 
contexts.107 Evidently, these two decisions differ in the claim brought before the 
Court by the plaintiff, in Soobramoney the grievance relates to the right of an individual 
to treatment, whereas in Grootboom it is a collective action to redress the violation of 
the right of a ‘segment’ of the population. This helps to further explain the changing 
nature of the standard of review and the different approach the Court took in 
rendering both judgments. 
 
 In a nutshell, the Court’s reasoning is supported by the transformative 
Constitution and aims at giving back rights to previously or presently disenfranchised 
groups in order to finally level the playing field.  In the context of socio-economic 
rights, the Constitution confers a wide discretion to the courts to ensure that the 
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needs of vulnerable groups are met. Although severely criticised over the past decade, 
the impact of this wide remedial power is undeniable and reinforced by the 
jurisprudence developed by the Constitutional Court.108 
 
 
II. THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE 
REVISITING THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE 
 
A. The Origin of the ‘Distinctive’ Separation of Powers Doctrine 
 The doctrine of separation of powers lies with the functional understanding 
that democracy and the rule of law must be divided, and that these powers should 
mutually check and balance each other. 109  The doctrine takes its roots in the 
Enlightenment period of the seventeenth-century in Europe. The abusive and 
absolute power of the monarchs was then put into perspective by political thinkers 
that aspired to reorganise schemes of governance. The goal was to prevent the 
accumulation of power in a single institution. 110  The traditional approach to the 
separation of powers doctrine is usually based on the assumption that the 
constitution represents an end in itself. Indeed, this formal document ultimately aims 
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at regulating the exercise of power and preserving the rights of individuals in a 
political community.111 
 
 The modern concept of separation of powers draws a lot from its origins, but 
adds on to it in some aspects by being more concerned with organisation theory and 
the design of an ideal structure of power. This doctrine is most often times portrayed 
as a concept that should be depoliticised, formalised, as well as justificatory. 112 
Furthermore, the modern doctrine also caters for the cases where one of the 
branches improperly exercises its power, and for probable scenarios where 
government has to organise and coordinate solutions to complex problems.113 
 
 Originally South Africa had a Westminster system of centralised power lying 
within an elected Parliament.114 After the democratic shift in 1994, the drafters of the 
first democratic Constitution had separation of power on their priority list as it was, 
and still is, a synonym of good governance and democracy.115 The First Certification 
of the Constitution Judgment stated that no universal model of separation of powers 
was ever coined and therefore, that no absolute doctrine could ever be achieved 
merely with checks and balances.116 This partly explains why the 1996 Constitution is 
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silent on the topic. The concept, and a more fluid understanding of it are obviously to 
be implied from the drafting.117 In the Court’s words separation of powers should 
“embod[y] a system of checks and balances to prevent an over-
concentration of power in any one arm of government it 
[should] anticipate the necessary or unavoidable intrusion of 
one branch on the terrain of another; this engenders 
interaction, but does so in way which avoids diffusing power 
so completely that government is unable to take timely 
measures in the public interest.”118 
Also implied is the crucial role reserved to courts making them the guardians and 
promoter of fundamental constitutional values.119 South African courts are made final 
arbitrators of the nature and extent of the power of all branches120, they also ensure 
that all “act in accordance with, and within the limits of, the Constitution”.121 
 
 The drafting provides fertile ground for a constitutional dialogue between all 
branches of the government. A system of mutual control and accountability is 
established primarily through the judicial review of governmental actions. Although 
the harmonious system has in part achieved its transformative goals South Africa’s 
model of separation of powers further ensures that the doctrine does not become 
static or hermetic to social change. 122 
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 Consequently the concept is the source of abstract rules reshaping powers and 
functions producing some checks and balances.123 As Seedorf and Sibanda explain 
further:  
“The point about checks and balances is precisely that they do 
provide for interference between the branches of government. 
The courts are asked carefully to examine if such interference 
is an unwarranted intrusion into the domain and independent 
functioning of one branch of government or another 
constitutional body, or if such interference constitutes an 
institutional safeguard designed to prevent the abuse of power. 
(…) Checks and balances allow for interdependencies, but 
these must be safeguarded against abuse of power.”124 
 
 This ‘distinctively’ South African doctrine has developed thanks to the 
transformative adjudication process led by its Constitutional Court. No international 
precedents can constrain the application of this unique model. Overall the South 
African model of separation of powers is more concerned with guiding principles 
than predetermined answers.125 
 
B. The South African ‘trialogue’ 
 The South African Constitution envisages interactions between power-sharing 
institutions. 126  Although all of the branches of government have pre-eminent 
domains and are independently required to carry out their respective missions, they 
are still led down the road of interdependency when it comes to the implementation 
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of comprehensive and participatory social programmes and legislation. This 
distinctively South African relationship maintained by the different branches of 
power predates the Constitution. In fact, the Certification Judgement itself evidences the 
“constitutional dialogue” since courts were already given the opportunity to discuss 
the extent and constitutionality of other branches’ actions at that stage.127 
 
  Post certification, the dialogue can unfold in three possible ways. On the one 
hand, the Court proceeds to the judicial review of legislation or conduct, striking 
down any inconsistency with the Constitution. It will also identify the defects, and 
methods to fix any of the uncovered issues, and will allow other branches to redress 
any inconsistencies. Second, when members of the executive apply to the 
Constitutional Court seeking constitutional review of a bill, the Court will make its 
assessment with careful consideration to insure it does not infringe on other 
branches’ roles. Finally, in the realm of socio-economic rights adjudication, when the 
court is seized to evaluate a governmental policy, it will decide whether the policy is 
reasonable, or identify deficiencies, and if necessary allow the government to 
remedy.128 The Constitutional Court is guarding the Constitution while respecting its 
institutional function, preventing the executive and the legislature from accumulating 
too much power. While fulfilling its constitutional mandate it also guarantees 
institutional security with its capacity to check and balance the other branches of 
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government. 129  This method naturally nurtures the constitutional conversation 
between the different branches. It also ensures that all branches never run afoul of 
the Constitution.130 
 
 Manifestly institutions are engaged in a dialogue thanks to their core functions. 
They respect their respective constitutional roles and participate in upholding the 
Constitution.131 This approach results in the harmonious meshing of independence 
with interdependence. 132  In the context of socio-economic rights, adjudication 
remains circumscribed to available state resources. Therefore, the justiciability of 
socio-economic rights implies some form of scrutiny, however limited, of financial 
and budgetary decisions. This is both unavoidable and necessary.133 
 
 It is the distinctiveness of South Africa’s history that creates its unique balance 
of powers doctrine. Thanks to the ‘dialogue’ courts can complete the political power’s 
potential failures. Nonetheless, outside the courtroom the judiciary has little but no 
say in the dealings of any other branches of the government. This ‘pick-and-choose’ 
approach is particularly useful in addressing separation of powers issues.134 
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 Certain functions and powers fall squarely under one of the branches’ purview 
and monopoly. The balancing act triggered by this constitutional ‘trialogue’ holds up 
because of the branches’ mutual respect of their pre-eminent domains. Interference 
with pre-domains cannot be permitted or excused on the account of ‘check and 
balances’.135 In T.A.C., the Court made this point stating that:  
“[A]lthough there are no bright lines that separate the roles of 
the legislature, the executive and the courts from one another, 
there are certain matters that are pre-eminently within the 
domain of one or other of the arms of government and not 
the others. All arms of government should be sensitive to and 
respect this separation.”136 
The pre-eminent domain doctrine does not constitute an absolute bar on judicial 
intervention, but demands a higher level of justification for judicial intervention.137 
 
 The separation of powers manifests itself beyond specific guarantees. The 
legislature and the executive are independent but still pursue their policy goals 
attentively and remain sensitive to all other branches’ advice. Obviously, the 
Constitution cannot provide for all aspects of life. This leaves considerable latitude 
for a range of policy decisions, all of which must still be made in conformity with the 
Constitution.138 
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III. IS AMERICA TRAPPED IN ITS PATH OF DEPENDENCY? 
 It is hazardous and also difficult to compare the product of two socially and 
culturally different constitutional systems. Nonetheless it is still interesting to draw a 
comparison between the American and South African Constitutional Courts when it 
comes to resource allocation. One outstanding difference between these systems is 
certainly the lack of socio-economic rights in the American Constitution.139 
 
A. The Rejection of the Socio-Economic Rights  
 The rejection of socio-economic rights by the American legal system is rooted 
in a much deeper debate than the mere labelling of certain rights under this category. 
It is more the constant balancing act between promoters of a more interventionist 
State in favour of a broad redistribution of resource, and a more conservative neo-
liberal faction that wishes to see State freedom and overall liberties better protected 
that runs the debate.140 Paradoxically, one may forget that the promotion of freedom 
and property protection also requires extensive resources from the State. Therefore, 
even watchman-type States require some degree of intervention and redistribution, 
even if ultimately it results in favouring the interests of private property owners and 
not the poor. In this respect, it is only fair to say that one cannot be concerned with 
freedom without being concerned with subsistence.141 
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The absence of socio-economic rights in any legally binding or formalised 
document may also flow from a disagreement on distribution at a national level, and 
the ferocious opposition of many lobbying groups having vested corporate interests 
militating against their implementation at the international level. 
 
 Also, the contours of civil-political and socio-economic rights are distinct, the 
former being more interpretative, whereas the latter are more determinative.142 The 
American constitutional tradition assumes that courts will see their task lightened 
with the enforcement of negative political and civil rights rather than positive socio-
economic rights. This may be because it is simpler for a court to order the 
government to stop interfering with a constitutional right, rather to make some 
intricate budgetary determinations. 143  Nevertheless, Mark Tushnet, Cass Sunstein, 
Sandra Liebenberg, and others scholars established that enforcing negative rights also 
implicates budgetary matters. Sunstein supports that:  
“So-called negative rights are emphatically positive rights. In 
facts rights, even the most conventional, have costs. Rights of 
property and contract, as well as rights of free speech and 
religious liberty, need significant taxpayer support.”144 
 Conversely to the South African Bill of Rights that opts for a ‘laundry list’ 
approach to these rights,145 the United State Supreme Court has only implied the 
existence of certain fundamental personal rights flowing from personal rights in the 
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liberty provision of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause146. It is with 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Lochner v New York147 that the basic criteria 
were fleshed out. Nonetheless, the American Supreme Court has systematically 
rejected socio-economic rights claims under both Substantive Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clause doctrines, although it has shown to be more receptive to hybrid 
“equal protection fundamental interests” claims,148 but even then, the Court has tried 
to find a different angle, such as the right to travel or the right to vote.149 
 
 The reluctance of American judges to enforce, or all together recognise these 
rights may also be explained by some fundamental cultural differences. The strong 
European heritage present in South Africa’s policy making translates into the crafting 
of laws that aim at eradicating discrepancies between social classes, whereas American 
policy makers tend to reject the idea of classes and therefore believe that the 
existence of socio-economic rights cannot be justified in a society where all is within 
reach with hard work and determination, and this is regardless of one’s economic 
background. 
 
  Surprisingly enough, in some respects the South African Constitutional Court 
has been inspired by the American model. Nonetheless, it has proven to take a more 
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flexible approach to the political question doctrine.150 The stringent conception of 
judicial review in America has forced the Supreme Court to decline standing to any 
political question. This approach was authoritatively declared in Baker v Carr 151 . 
Although constitutional questions remain inevitably political questions, in his opinion 
Justice Brennan reiterates that the political question doctrine is “essentially a function 
of separation of powers”.152 
 
 Comparatively, political questions in South Africa are not political matters or 
cases in nature. The determining factor remains the methodology to be applied by the 
court in rendering its judgment. Questions that fall under the ambit of the political 
question doctrine are essentially the ones for which the Constitution does not provide 
a review standard.153 
 
 The line between a political and a legal question should not be drawn based on 
the subject matter of the dispute, but rather on whether the adjudicated claim can be 
resolved through the application of the law. Furthermore, the classification of an 
issue as ‘political’ should not be determinative of whether or not a court has standing 
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to adjudicate on the matter.154 The standing of political questions in the United State 
should therefore be revisited in order to adjudicate on issues relating to resource 
allocation and ‘socio-economic rights type of cases’. 
 
B. The American Firm Take on the Separation of Powers 
Doctrine 
 The omnipresent fear of usurpation of power by one of the branches of 
government in America has guided institutions to favour a ‘pure’ separation of 
powers doctrine. The role of the courts is confined to the observation of allocation 
issues. The courts will not act as an active agent of change and proceed to 
prescription for the allocation of State resources. The American conception of 
separation of powers implies that specific functions, duties and responsibilities be 
granted to distinctive institutions with strictly defined areas of competence and 
jurisdiction.155 This is based on the rationale that specialised institutions are better 
equipped to perform particular functions. 156  The words of Montesquieu seem to 
animate the spirit of the American doctrine: 
“[There is no] liberty if the power of judging is not separate 
from legislative power and from executive powers. …All 
would be lost if the same man or the same body of principal 
men, either of nobles, or of the people, exercised these three 
powers: that of making the laws, that of executing public 
resolutions, and that of judging the crimes or the disputes of 
individuals.”157 
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On the other hand, the check and balances system coupling the separation powers of 
doctrine ensures that institutions do not become self-centred in the execution of their 
roles and that their functions are efficiently fulfilled.158 
 
 The American Supreme Court firmly believes that “the Constitution does not 
empower [the] Court to second-guess state officials charged with the difficult 
responsibility of allocating limited public welfare funds among the myriad of potential 
recipients.”159 In this very same foundational case, Dandridge v Williams, the Court 
itself strongly replicates that “problems presented by public welfare assistance 
programs are not the business of [the] Court.”160 
 
 The American separation of powers doctrine leaves no room for the 
commingling of the different branches’ interests or functions. It is the rigid 
application of the doctrine that accounts for the Court’s reluctance to recognise a 
more flexible approach, and explains its coy attitude towards the adjudication of 
resource allocation cases. 
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C. The US Health Care Reform and Allocation of Resources 
Problem  
 The American health care system currently faces issues flowing from its 
particular financing scheme. Paths of dependencies make it uneasy to restructure the 
overall distribution processes without encountering some hurdles. The system 
remains largely operated by private sector insurers, reducing their liability and 
increasing their profit margins by applying drastic underwriting rules; thus leaving a 
majority of the population in the hands of publicly-funded programs that are already 
exhausting government budgets. 
 
The health care reform put in place by the Obama administration is an 
attempt to tackle the system’s shortcomings. Having been challenged four times 
before federal judges161, the fate of the reform was put in the hands of the Supreme 
Court162. The constitutionality of the ACA’s163 individual mandate that requires all 
Americans to maintain some form of health insurance is now certain. Indeed, on June 
28, 2012 the Supreme Court finally published its decision to uphold the individual 
mandate. Four out of five Supreme Court judges voted in favour of that decision. 
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Chief Justice Roberts offers a long and complex opinion analysing the reasons 
behind the surprising judgment. Some saw in his discourse a high-minded approach 
paving a new way forward to finally bring together the Court across its ideological 
divide, thus taking a first step in restoring its reputation. Many others found to the 
contrary that his opinion was only an impoverished reading of the Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence that will result in further narrowing the powers of the Federal 
government over the coming decades.164 
 
Many scholars had hoped that the challenge would create an opportunity for 
high-level constitutional lawyers to bring forward resource allocation issues, and for 
Justices to craft a targeted solution directly addressing the topic of health care.  
Unfortunately, this decision does not constitute an ‘out of the box’ judgment. No 
core issues surrounding health care resource allocation were directly addressed or 
even really argued in front of the Supreme Court. All constitutionality issues were 
strictly resolved through constitutional and political considerations. Furthermore, no 
real contextualisation effort was made on the part of the Chief Justice despite Justice 
Ginsburg’s opinion that certainly aimed at addressing the particular nature of health 
care and its allocation.165 
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In a nutshell, the Court’s ruling makes the individual mandate a mere invitation to 
buy insurance rather than an order. The Supreme Court failed to grasp the 
uniqueness of health care as a common good. The judgment is not based on the right 
to health but on an interpretation of the Constitution that sways universality of care 
far away from any legal debate. 
 
In this case and over the years, the American Supreme Court has not been 
keen on recognising the importance of contextualisation. Nonetheless, if it was to 
take a closer read of its health care financing history it would bring itself to 
understand that the law and its interpretation cannot withdraw itself from the path 
health care financing and services authorities have paved for themselves. Changes 
need to be operated at the judiciary level to reach better allocation. A contextualised 
approach is now necessary to solve the pressing insurability problem. 
 
D. Are Cases Dealing with Segregation Providing Part of the 
Solution? 
 Unbeknownst to itself, the American Supreme Court has in the past provided 
a potential solution to its hermetic separation of powers doctrine and resource 
allocation issues. The Court has provided efficient injunctive relief and remedy. The 
foundational civil right case Brown v Board of Education of Topeka (Brown)166  and its 
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related cases167 mark a turning point for the American legal system, partly for the 
change it ingrained in the 1950s society, and for its repercussion in time. Finally 
banning segregation in the school system, the legal crafting emanating from the case 
also triggered an original remedy system. In this landmark case the Court empowered 
itself and bent the boundaries of separation of powers to provide a more efficient 
resolution. The case was propelled by the necessity to transform the dual school 
system based on race originally instigated and supported by the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Plessy v Ferguson168. Needless to say that a ‘classic one-stance’ ruling and 
remedial solution on the part of the Supreme Court could not have palliated 
hundreds of years of segregating practices. The expectations were high, therefore 
important organisational reforms169 had to be put in place. The lower courts had the 
mission to transform the entrenched statu quo. Most importantly, compliance and 
follow up mechanisms had to be imagined. In sum, lower courts were mandated with 
reconstructing a social reality in a radical manner. 
 
 Bearing in mind all of these implications the Supreme Court proceeded with 
supervisory orders to be closely followed by the defendants and all schools in the 
nation. The Court provided advice on the way lower courts should discharge their 
roles, and further added to the promotion of principles of equity “characterised by a 
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practical flexibility in shaping the remedies and facility for adjusting and reconciling 
public and private needs” to their mission.170 
 
This ruling exemplifies the ‘uber’ power the Court is capable of granting itself 
in order to achieve ambitious and profound social change. The Court wittily 
interfered with the executive in providing lower courts and other public institutions 
with strict guidance to comply with its supervisory orders. It further demonstrated its 
capacity to deal with a more fluid balance of power, making it a strong agent of 
change. This jurisprudence evidences the catalytic power the Supreme Court can 
trigger to make the American society more just. This segregation foundational 
jurisprudence may very well hold part of the solution to health care resource 
allocation problems.  
 
 
IV. LEGAL TRANSPLANTS A CURE FOR ‘CONSTITUTIONAL ILLS’? 
A. No transplantation of Rights, Only Just Implementation  
More than the potent power of socio-economic rights and their presence in a 
legal corpus, the key to a just distribution of common goods lies with a proactive 
method of adjudication. As exemplified by the Brown case just distribution and 
efficient implementation reside in a more ‘hands-on’ approach taken by the Court. 
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The United States and South Africa are very similarly situated when it comes 
to health care issues. Both countries have to deal with their past, for one it is the 
deeply engrained libertarian roots leading the debate in health care policy and the 
predominant place taken by the private sector in the distribution of care; for the other 
it is a clearly identifiable venerable group previously disenfranchised with growing 
health needs. The different solutions coined to alleviate scarcity in both of these 
countries remain inadequate due to the reluctance of the Supreme Court to 
contextualise and embrace better solutions to sever paths of dependencies, or 
because of the Constitutional Court’s inefficient supervision of remedial measures. 
 
Perhaps the ‘constitutional ills’ experienced by South Africa and America 
require a more robust approach to the adjudication of health rights rather than the 
transplantation of socio-economic rights. Indeed, the American Supreme Court could 
benefit from a more dynamic reading of the 14th Amendment, Substantial Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clause doctrine resulting in a more contextualised 
interpretation of allocation cases. On the other hand, the South African 
Constitutional Court could benefit from a more direct supervisory role when it comes 
to the implementation of the remedies it prescribes in allocation cases.  
 
B. The Transplantation of an Interpretative Methodology 
 
 An institutional dialogue denotes a healthy democratic process. However, courts 
should not make any fundamental departure from the doctrine of separation of powers, 
and for that matter should not feel the need to precisely decide the content of socio-
47 
economic rights or of any rights leading to the allocation of resources. The role of the 
courts should be interpretative identifying the particular interests falling within the 
boundaries of the right, all of this in a ‘context-sensitive’ manner. It is important to have 
the participatory institutions of the executive and the legislature decide on the processes 
of allocation. The judiciary shall keep in check the two other branches of government to 
insure that the allocation is properly executed.171  
 
 Evidently, while deciding constitutional matters, and more particularly ones 
involving allocation of scarce resources, judges will have to perform a complex balancing 
act between their role of protectors of the Constitution and the importance to provide 
necessary enforcement powers to vulnerable groups. 172 As suggested by Sandra 
Liebenberg, the courts should operate “a context-sensitive assessment” of the impact the 
denial of a particular right could have on the claimant.173 Indeed, the success of socio-
economic rights rests in the possibility to remedy the effects of material deprivation 
thanks to the ability of these rights to connect with the needs and experiences of the 
beneficiaries.174 
 
 The transplantation of the South African contextualising adjudication method 
and the dialogue present amongst the institutions constitute examples to be transplanted 
in the United States. 
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CONCLUSION 
 In spite of the South African Constitutional Court’s remarkable 
contextualising approach and the fact that its jurisprudence has demonstrated that 
the judiciary can enforce socio-economic rights without intruding into essentially 
legislative or executive functions;175 the prescriptions made by the Courts in socio-
economic cases raise some intricate social justice questions. It is true that  
“over time [the South African] courts [have] develop[ed] a 
distinctively South African model of separation of powers, one 
that fits the particular system of government provided for the 
Constitution and that reflects a dedicate balancing, informed 
by South Africa’s history and it new dispensation, between the 
need on the one hand to control government by separating 
powers and enforcing checks and balances, and, on the other, 
to avoid diffusing power so completely that the government is 
unable to take timely measures in the public interest.”176 
 
 A recurring theme in deliberation on health-related cases is the ‘inescapable 
reality’ of resource scarcity leading to rationing processes. Individual needs will have 
to be ranked and potentially sacrificed resulting in a ‘tragic choice’.177 Evidently, this 
will lead to the non-satisfaction of particular needs putting the Court at the heart of 
the distribution processes. 178  Nonetheless this should not justify individual 
entitlements always being sacrificed in favour of the ‘common good’. 179  The 
enforcement of socio-economic rights potentially holds the solution to palliate the 
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‘inescapable realities’180 if, and only if, the Constitutional Court subjects the other 
branches of the government to strict scrutiny, evaluating their implementation of 
socio-economic rights and providing supervision of remedial measures.  
 
 Soobramoney exemplifies the South African Court’s tendency to embrace an 
inherently utilitarian philosophy when rendering resource allocation judgements. 
Sacrificing Mr. Soobramoney, and all other similar situated patients, to the interests of 
the majority reads into having a person’s sacrifice being justified if it results in the 
promotion of an overarching public interest.181 In the starkest terms, the ruling in this 
case resulted in a choice between Mr. Soobramoney’s death or the death and 
suffering of a group of others.182 Interestingly enough, in the landmark cases heard by 
the Constitutional Court priority setting was mostly operated along the lines of 
utilitarian principles. Much naturally, the South African system of adjudication has 
taken a pragmatic, cost-control driven approach to allocation disputes. 
 
 In some commentators’ opinions South Africa has accomplished what the 
United States Supreme Court has not yet proven capable of achieving: using an 
innovative contextualising method of interpretation.183 Indeed, there is an obvious 
need for a more flexible separation of power in America, nonetheless it should not be 
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leaning towards utilitarian prescriptions in the same manner as its South African 
counterpart. Perhaps both Courts have to learn that the just allocation of resources 
not only requires flexibility, balancing and contextualisation, but should also reflect 
just principles, and not strictly efficiency and cost containment determinations. 
 
